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Pecuniary I mplications of the 
Proposal for Extending the 
Teacher Education Programme 
in Universities. 
by Ross J. Harrold, 
University of New England. 
Introduction 
The proposal by Fielding, Cavanagh and Widdowson* is that universities 
should replace the present four-year pre-service teacher training (both end-on 
and concurrent) with a four-phase scheme requiring five years for the 
completion of the three pre-service phases. 
The first phase comprises three years' study towards a relevant 
undergraduate degree. The second is one year's internship in a school, under 
the tutelage of a 'master teacher'. In the third phase, the student returns to his 
Alma Mater to complete one year's study of the fundamental aspects of 
educational knowledge. The trainee becomes a fully certified teacher at the 
completion of this third. phase. The fourth open-ended phase refers to the in-
service and continuing education and training of the classroom teacher. 
Our particular interest is with the second phase, since this is the most novel 
aspect of the proposal. If the proposal is to be implemented successfully, it 
must be acceptable to various parties - the Commonwealth Government as a 
principal funding agent, the State Governments through their departments of 
education, the university councils and faculties, and the students themselves. 
This paper interprets acceptability in terms of the relative magnitudes of the 
expected financial benefits and costs of the proposed scheme to each of the 
parties concerned. There are of course other aspects to acceptability besides 
financial - e.g. political, administrative and organizational. It is left to the 
reader to weigh up the financial with the various non-financial implications of 
the scheme, to come to some overall assessment as to whether the scheme 
should be implemented. . 
Our purpose therefore is to explicate the major costs and benefits likely to 
be perceived by the relevant parties and thus to anticipate the enthusiasm 
they are likely to exhibit towards the scheme. We could find that while the 
scheme appears to be worthwhile from a social perspective, one party does 
not find it so, perhaps because the perceived costs of the extended internship 
scheme are too high. In such a situation, action might be required to reduce 
these costs in order for the scheme to appear more acceptable to that party. 
We thus need to appreciate the nature of the costs which are likely to be 
incurred and their distribution of burden between the various parties involved. 
* Fielding, A.I., Cavanagh, D.M. and Widdowson, R.E.(eds.). Teacher Training: Anti-Climax to 
Education Woolongong: University of Wollongong 1977. 
(A shorter version of this was published in AJTE in November, 1978-Ed) 
The Nature and Distribution of Internship Costs 
Trying to assess what are likely to be the costs of an internship scheme and 
how the burden of these costs is shared, are complex tasks. Let us make two 
preliminary points. 
Firstly, we can view the proposed scheme as essentially to extend the 
length of a student teacher's practicum by 160 days i.e. from the present 
required 40 days to 200 days. Nevertheless, the scheme effectively increases 
the student's whole t~acher education course by a full academic year. The 
final year, without any practicum, is effectively extended by 40 lecture days. 
Secondly, we assume that before the school year commences, interns are 
given a residential induction course to provide an introduction to school 
organization and principles of teaching. This will involve the university in 
outlays on additional lecturing duties and interns on accommodation and 
materials. 
Table 1 attempts to summarize the nature and distribution of the costs 
incurred by a student teacher's involvement in the proposed internship 
scheme. The format of the table distinguishes between that entity which 
makes payments and that which actually bears the burden or sacrifice. The 
distinction lies partly in the funding arrangements for education in Australia. 
For example, to the extent that the Commonwealth is willing to incorporate 
the internship program in its funding formulae, the payments made initially by 
the university, ultimately are translated into a cost burden on the 
Commonwealth Government. 
The table distinguishes between payments made to purchase specific 
services (actual outlays) and pro rata payments made to those who provide 
services to the internee as part of their employment. (-called imputed 
outlays). 
The table postulates that there is a further cost involved. Under the 
internship scheme the student is introduced gradually to the teaching 
situation, probably spending a good deal of his time in remedial work with 
small groups of children. At a maximum, he is expected to undertake a half 
class contact load. Yet as a graduate, he already has done as much tertiary 
preparation for teaching as those who gain a certificate or diploma of teaching 
from a College of Advanced Education. An alternative version of the 
internship scheme could be that the intern be considered as a full classroom 
teacher(1), under the supervision of a master teacher, and be paid at the 'first 
step' salary of a two-year trained assistant viz $8,800. Of this, some $1,600 
would be paid in Commonwealth income tax, leaving him with $7,200. This 
income forgone by the intern is largely offset, however, by the scholarship 
payment to the intern of half the 'first step' salary of a four year trained 
assistant teacher viz $4,870. In other words the State Government shares 
some of the cost burden of the intern being held back from full remunerative 
(1) In England, till recently, university graduates could become 'direct entry' teachers, without 
preservice training. This service (valued at that of a teacher's aide) is considered an offset to the 
State's scholarship payment. 
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employment. In return for his scholarship allowance, however, the intern does 
provide some teaching service to his school-albeit in a subsidiary capacity. 
The most noticable feature of the table is that there are considerable 
differences between the accounted outlays and the economic costs, or 
sacrifices, of thescheme. The sacrifices required to be made are neither equal 
to, nor borne by those who make the actual outlays. For example the 
Commonwealth government is shown to bear the cost burden of the 
University programme. Moreover the costs exceed the additional grants it 
makes through the Universities Council, by an amount equal to lost income 
tax revenue from a full-time teacher. (2) 
Likewise the student and his family make sacrifices of uncompensated lost 
earnings, which are nearly twelve times the private course outlays. On the 
other hand, the cost burden on the State Government is shown to be 
considerably less than the education department's actual and imputed outlays 
on the intern, because of the offsetting teaching services given by him. 
Cost burdens are more relevant than actual outlays in affecting the likely 
acceptability of the proposed scheme to the various parties concerned. If a 
body is confident that all or most of the payments incurred by a decision will 
be reimbursed by another, cost considerations are unlikely to weigh heavily in 
the making of that decision. 
(2) Note that the payment of a teacher's salary is made by the State government while income 
taxation is received by the Commonwealth Government. 
(a) Master teacher assumed to be paid at full daily rate for professional assistance for 
160 days at the daily rate of $5.67 (unsupervised practice, reports not required, for a 
two-methods student). 
(b) Induction course outlays assumed made by university of lecturers and by students 
on accommodation and related expenses. 
(c) Course related outlays refer to required fees, transport and requisites for teaching 
preparation. 
(d) Fielding et al propose that the master teacher be given a time allowance to counsel 
his intern. The assumed cost is based on one period per week allowed to a master 
teacher who is also a subject master. 
(e) Assumed that the worth of the teaching services of an untrained graduate, teaching 
his own classes, would be of equivalent worth to a two year trained teacher in first 
year of teaching. viz. $8,800. Of this, personal disposable income would be 
approximately $7,200, since $1,600 would be required in income tax. This 
disposable income forgone is assumed to be offset by the Education Department 
paying a scholarship to the student of $4,870-half the salary of a four year trained 
teacher in his first year of teaching. The $2,330 represents the net income forgone of 
the student. 
(f) The intern can be expected to give some teaching services, most of these 
presumably providing assistance to the master and other teachers. These services 
are given an assumed value equivalent to a half-time teacher aide ($2,520). 
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Conversely, if a body knows that a decision ~i11 entail lo~t ?p~ortunities of 
considerably greater value than the outlays it mcurs, then I~ IS likely to make 
decisions which differ significantly from what an observer might expect on the 
basis of actual outlays alone. 
We can summarize our analysis of Table 1, therefore, by saying that: 
(i) the total costs of the proposed internship year exceed by about ten 
percent, the actual outlays of the year, and 
(iil the cost burdens are borne roughly evenly between the Commonwealth, 
State and student's family. 
Note that the cost to the State of the whole internship s.che~e will ex.ceed 
that of the year, to the extent that in the following year It will pay a higher 
allowance to the student at university, than is paid at present(3) 
Note also, that if the State Government does. not grant .the stu.dent a 
scholarship and he has instead to rely on a Tertiary Education ASSistance 
Scheme allowance of $3,500, the total cost burden on the family would rise by 
$1,370 to $3,900, the Commonwealth's burden would increase to $4,087, 
while the State would be in the net benefit of $1,770. 
An Approach to Comparing the Acceptability of Teacher Education 
Programmes. 
Decisions are not made solely on the basis of costs. Even if costs ar~ ~igh: a 
decision might still be accept~ble if the benefits expected to flow from It JUStify 
its costs. ' 
There are a great many tangible and intangible educational benefits whic~ 
Fielding, Cavanagh and Widdowson (1977) clai~ would flow fror:n their 
extended teacher education program. Each party will no doubt make ItS own 
assessments of their validity, relevance and worth. Thes7 assessm~nts must 
of necessity be subjective, for there is little ~esearch eV.ldence which could 
demonstrate and verify the educational benefits they claim. 
We have no desire to challenge the reality or importance of the education~1 
benefits which the authors claim the program could generate .. Our purp~se IS 
to narrow the field of debate by taking account of the pecuniary. benefits to 
the various parties which could flow from the :cheme and by. relatm.g them to 
the costs we have discussed above. We certamly have no WIS~ to Imply that 
the financial aspects of the scheme are in any way more or less Important than 
its educational aspects. Our intention is to 'clear the ground' of debate by 
demonstrating the possible acceptability or otherwise of the scheme ~o the 
parties on solely pecuniary grounds. This aspect can then be considered 
alongside the sundry other aspects when policy decisions a~e being made. If, 
for example, the expected cultural, social and other benefits are very large, 
but the private financial returns over costs are me~gre, th~re co~ld be a .case 
for government acting to lower the costs and / or r~l:e the fmanclal ?e~e!lts to 
the individual, to increase the likelihood that a sufficient number of mdlvlduals 
will support the programme by enrolling in it. 
(3) The 1978 Year 4 allowance is $3,500 against the scheme's proposed $4,870-an increase of 
$1,370. 
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There is little meaning in studying the five year teacher education 
programme in vacuo, since through the eyes of all parties it will be seen as an 
alternative to the existing programs, viz the four year degree-diploma 
program of universities (4) and the three year diploma of teaching program at 
colleges of advanced education. For simplicity, all programs will be viewed as 
'packages' which are commenced from the first year of tertiary study. While it 
could be argued that the end-on diploma of education and post-graduate 
bachelor of education could be entered at the completion of the first degree, 
the constraints of teaching subject requirements set by employing authorities 
mean that in fact the student must make some commitment to an intended 
teaching career at quite an early stage of his primary degree program. 
Our procedure is to take each program in turn and relate the expected 
additional costs to be incurred, with the expected stream of additional 
benefits which will result over the working lifetime of the graduate. Since we 
have postulated that each program is to be taken as a package, the critical 
time of choice between programs is the time at which a matriculant makes his 
initial enrolment. 
For the purposes of our comparative study of incremental benefits and 
costs, therefore, we shall consider the case of a bright, ambitious matriculant 
from a poor family. Without further study he could obtain a job readily but he 
is seriously considering a teaching career. He knows he would have little 
trouble in graduating in minimum time. He wants to ensure that he receives 
reasonably rapid career advancement and its accompanying financial return to 
justify his sacrifices while training. 
There are three teacher training paths from which he can choose: 
(i) five years of university training which will yield a double degree (which 
includes a post-graduate education degree). 
(ii) four years of university training, which will give him a degree and 
diploma 
(iii) three years of training at a college of advanced education, which will 
result in a Diploma of Teaching. 
We assume that alternatives (i) and (ii) would lead him into secondary 
teaching and (iii) into a career in primary school teaching. He has learnt from 
his career advisory officer the approximate number of years it would take him 
to reach particular promotional positions if he entered the banking field 
immediately or gained teacher registration under each of the above three 
options. In particular, he is advised that since the major criterion for the 
placement of a graduate teacher on a promotions list is years of service, the 
additional post-graduate qualification gained from option (i) is unlikely to 
advance his prospects of early promotion by any more than one year, 
compared with his possessing a degree-diploma qualification. 
He knows that if he chooses option (i) he will receive a TEAS living-at-home 
allowance while he studies for his undergraduate degree, then for the intern 
year and for the final year of university study, he will receive half the first year 
(4) From the point of view of pecuniary costs and benefits, it is immaterial whether the diploma is 
obtained as a concurrent or an end-on qualification. 
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teacher's salary. If he chooses either option (ii) or (iii) he expects to receive a 
teacher education living-at-home scholarship for the duration of the 
programme. 
We shall consider this case from two decisional frames of reference-from 
the student's own perspective, in order to assess the relative attractiveness of 
each option to him and his family, and from the societal perspective, in order 
to consider the extent to which each appears to justify the commitment of 
society's resources. Societal costs and benefits include those borne and 
received by the student and the rest of society-the latter being represented 
by the Commonwealth and State Governments. On the (heroic) assumption 
that salary payments reflect with some accuracy the worker's social 
contribution (Le. that the worker is 'paid what he's worth') we take annual 
gross earning of a teacher to truly reflect the social value of his teaching 
services in that year. 
Likewise we take as social cost of a full-time student's study, the gross 
earnings he could have earnt if he was in full-time remuneration work, 
commensurate with his current educational achievements. 
The private individual is untroubled by any assumed connection between 
his earnings and his social contribution-he is concerned with how much is, 
or could be, in his own pay packet. From a private viewpoint, therefore, we 
consider the person's potell,~ial or actual income after the deduction of income 
taxation. ',', . 
With any evaluation of future educational alternatives the problem of 
differing time streams of costs and benefits must be faced. The costs of our 
options are borne over three, four or five years. The benefits are assumed to 
begin in the fourth, fifth or sixth year and to extend to the forty sixth year, 
assuming the teacher works until age sixty-five. Before we can compare an 
expected cost in say 1980 AD with an expected benefit in 2025 AD, we must 
bring both to the common time base of the present. (We therefore call these 
'present values'). This we do by the method of time discounting-which is 
essentially an inverted form of compound interest. There is no 'right' rate of 
time discounting which should be used. The rate considered by the 
decision maker to be appropriate depends on two main factors-la) the 
uncertainties that future events will occur and (b) the 'time preference' of the 
decision maker Le. the different importance a person gives to a particular cost 
or benefit occuring in the immediate, compared with the more distant, future. 
Because society can 'spread its risks' more easily than can individuals, (a) is 
a less important consideration from a social than from a private perspective. 
Thus social discount rates are generally lower than private rates. But since the 
analyst has no prior right to state what the 'proper' social or private rate of 
time discount should be, benefit-cost estimates are usually made using a 
range of rates, enabling the decision maker to pay most attention to those 
estimates calculated using what he believes to be the most appropriate rate. In 
the analysis below we have presented social benefit-cost ratios using discount 
rates from one to eight percent, and private ratios using rate of three, six, nine 
and twelve percent. 
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There is one final point in this introduction to the benefit-cost analysis, 
concerning the 'baseline' used for the calculation of the ratios. In our case 
study, the prior choice facing the matriculant is whether or not he should 
undertake any- tertiary study at all. He already possesses educational 
qualifications equal to most young people of his age. If employment 
opportunities exist he could find work immediately. From his private 
perspective while further study promises higher earnings after completion of 
his teacher training, the training itself will incur considerable sacrifices of 
forgone earnings and financial outlays. Will the present values of these future 
additional (incremental) earnings exceed the present values of the expected 
extra (incremental) costs of each study option? Similarly, from the social 
perspective: while the worker's productivity is likely to be enhanced by tertiary 
education, considerable production potential will be lost by the person not 
being in productive work during his training. Will the present value of the 
worker's additional productivity over his working life exceed the present value 
of production forgone, allowances given, and additional educational 
resources absorbed during each of the teacher training programme options? 
To answer both sets of questions, we compare the cost and subsequent 
earnings profiles expected from each of the programme options, with an 
estimate of the possible lifetime earnings profile of the matriculant if he 
entered the workforce directly from school. 
Private Benefit-Cost Ratios of Teacher Education Options 
Appendices 1-3 show the detailed benefit-cost calculations of each of the 
three options (i), (ii) and (iii) introduced earlier. Each seeks to represent the 
probable events in every year of the matriculant's subsequent career, then to 
compare his net (after tax) salary for that year (columns 1-3)(5) with his net 
wage if he had undertaken no further study (columns 4-6)(6). 
Column 7 shows the difference between these two income streams for each 
year. The negative incomes (earnings forgone) during the teacher preparation 
years represent the costs of each option; the positive incomes after 
appointment as a teacher represent the option's benefits. Before the age-
specific negative or positive incomes are aggregated each is discounted to 
derive a net present value, (in these appendices a discount rate of 12% is 
used) the benefit-cost ratio is simply the ratio of the aggregate of the net 
present values of the positive incomes (the benefits) to the aggregate of the 
net present values of the negative incomes (the costs). 
Before we present the final benefit-cost ratios for each option using various 
discount rates, it might help clarify the exercise if the mathematical results of 
(5) During teacher training, column 1 data represent the value of the student's teacher education 
scholarship for options (i) and (iii) and years 4 and 5 of option (i) or the value of a TEAS allowance for 
years 1-3 of option (i) Column 2 represents his course-related outlays estimated from 
Commonwealth Department of Education Income & Expenditure Patterns of Australian Tertiary 
Students in 1974 Research Report No. 1 Table 36, updated to 1977 prices using the C.P.I. 
(6) Estimated age-specific gross earnings of the matriculant are the mean earnings of full-year full-
time workers with matriculation but with no post-school qualifications, reported in Australian 
Bureau of Statistics Income Distribution 1973-4 (Ref. 17,18) updated by use of index of award 
wages, to Nov. 1977. 
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GRAPH 1 
Net Present and Current Incremental Earnings Expected from 
a Five Year Teacher Education Program (Option 1) 
(12 percent time discount rate) 
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these appendices are shown in graphical form. The horizontal line of Graph 1 
represents the 'baseline' earnings profile of the matriculant worker. The 
negative incomes below the baseline represent the costs and the positive 
incomes above the baseline represent the benefits of each of the three 
options. 
The most striking feature of the graph is the extent to which time 
discounting diminishes the present values of earnings expected to be received 
in the more distant future. Although a principal's age-specific salary is very 
much larger than that of the matriculant worker, the time at which the 
principal's position is expected to be reached is so far into the future, that the 
differential makes a quite modest contribution to aggregate benefits. 
Table 2 and its accompanying Graph 2 present an array of benefit-cost 
ratios from the perspective of the individual. Comparisons are made between 
ratios appropriate to a selected time discount rate. As mentioned earlier, the 
individual who pays most attention to his incomes and outgoes in the shorter 
term future would compare the ratios calculated with a higher discount rate: 
the person who takes a longer term view and considers his incremental 
earnings later in his career almost as highly as those in his early career would 
pay most attention to the ratios which use a low discount rate. 
The higher the discount rate, the lower the benefit-cost ratios because (as 
Graph 2 shows) of the smaller benefits from incremental earnings in the more 
distant future. Nevertheless, all three options are acceptable investments for 
the individual at even the high rates of discount, since benefits exceed costs (B/C'::>1). 
More significant for our purposes is the comparison between options. As 
the double degree program (Option 1) has the lowest benefit-cost ratio of the 
three programmes for every time discount rate. m This suggests that under the 
proposed conditions of student allowances and promotional criteria, the 
proposed teacher education programme which includes a one year internship 
will be less attractive than either of the two present programmes, to a bright 
matriculant who pays attention to the effects of his programme of studies on 
his later career earnings. It should be recognized that although the relative 
ratios diverge somewhat at higher discount rates, the difference between 
them is never very great. 
We can say, therefore, that even if the matriculant is aware of, and pays 
heed to results such as these, he is unlikely to let them outweigh other non-
pecuniary implications of choosing one or other of the options. Put 
differently, other non-pecuniary benefits which the student expects to obtain 
from choosing to take option 1 might offset its relatively adverse benefit-cost 
ratio, to make it the most desirable option of the three. 
(7) While it is not central to our current exercise, a comparison of options (ii) and (iii) is interesting. 
While the career opportunities of a secondary teacher with a degree and diploma of education are 
greater that those of a primary teacher with a three year Diploma of Education, the costs of the 
former are higher, thus a career-oriented matriculant (with a low discount rate) is likely to find the 
longer tertiary programme preferable. Someone who has a shorter time horizon would find no basis 
for deciding between these programmes on pecuniary grounds. 
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TABLE 2 
Private Benefit-Cost Ratios for Alternative 
Teacher Education Options 
Option Program Time Discount Rate 
". 3 percent 6 percent 9 percent 12 percent 
(i) Five year double 
degree 6.15 3.38 2.07 1.38 
(iil Four year degree-
dip.ed. 6.97 3.87 2.40 1.63 
(iii) Three year diploma 6.53 3.72 2.38 1.67 
GRAPH 2 
Private Benefit-Cost Ratios at Different 
,B/~ Ratios Time Discount Rates 
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Social Benefit-Cost Ratios 
The main difference between the basis of social and the private benefit-cost 
calculations is that the former takes a production rather than an income 
orientation. That is, the society is not so interested in how much a worker 
might receive, as the value of what he might contribute to society. In public 
service activities such as education, it is extremely difficult to obtain an 
unambiguous estimate of the value of the social contribution of a worker's 
services. As we mentioned earlier the best approximate value of this 
contribution is the gross salary the government employing authority is 
prepared to pay the worker. ISI By this reasoning, the income tax paid from 
gross salary is irrelevant, for it affects only the distribution of the fruits of the 
worker's production: the higher the proportion of salary paid in taxation, the 
greater the share of the fruits of the worker's production which others ('the 
society') receive. From the same social perspective, the costs of a student's 
full-time study are taken to be the actual and imputed outlays of the 
educational institution, plus the gross earnings forgone by his not working. 
The magnitude of any student allowance is irrelevant, for the same reason 
that income tax payment is irrelevant-it affects only the distribution of the 
social cost. 
Appendix 4 details the estimated annual social costs of each of the teacher 
education options. The stream of social benefits expected to flow from each 
option is taken to be the difference between gross teacher salary (column 1) 
and gross matriculant wage (column 4) in the relevant appendix. Both costs 
and benefits are discounted at 1,2,4 and 6 percent, to yield the social benefit-
cost ratios reported below in Table 2. 
As expected, the social benefit-cost ratios of all options are less than the 
private ratios for any given discount rate. Nevertheless, all benefit-cost ratios 
still exceed unity: that is, the present value of the stream of social benefits (as 
measured by incremental gross earnings) still exceed the discounted social 
costs of the teacher education programmes. This suggests that all three 
options are worthwhile social investments, despite their costs. 
The relative social benefit-cost ratios at each discount rate are similar to 
those found for the private benefit-cost ratios. The five-year double-degree 
teacher education programme consistently has less favourable ratios than the 
other options for all time discount rates considered. The higher the discount 
rate the slightly more favourable is the ratio of option (i) compared with option 
(ii). This is because the higher gross earnings later in the teacher's working life 
become more heavily discounted than the higher costs of the five-year teacher 
education programme. 
Particularly significant is the fact that there is a difference in the dispersion 
between the social and the private benefit-cost ratios. Table 4 demonstrates 
that at the low three percent discount rate the private benefit-cost ratio of 
option (i) is 6-13 percent less than those of the other options, whereas the 
social ratio of option (i) is 26-34% less than those of the others. Thus from a 
(8) Age-specific salaries are primarily the result of industrial agreements in which seniority rather 
than merit or productivity is the major determinant. 
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social viewpoint this analysis suggests it will be difficult to argue the case that 
educational and other non-financial benefits which the internship scheme 
claims to generate, will be large enough to offset these adverse benefit-cost 
ratios and to justify the programme's implementation. 
TABLE 3 
Social Benefit-Cost Ratios for 
Alternative Teacher Education Options 
Options Programme Time discount rates (percent) 
234 5 678 
(i) Five year double 
degree 5.41 4.26 3.41 2.76 2.21 1.84 1.55 
(ii) Four year degree 
+dip. ed. 6.86 5.40 4.31 3.49 2.70 2.27 1.93 
(iii) Three year diploma 7.26 5.71 4.57 3.72 3.07 2.57 2.18 
Sources: Appendices 1-4 
GRAPH 3 
Social Benefit-Cost Ratios at Different 
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1.32 
1.66 
1.88 
TABLE 4 
A Comparison of Benefit-Cost Ratios at 
Three Percent Discount Rate 
Option (i) Option (ii) 
Private 
Benefit-cost ratios 6.15 6.97 
Index (Option (i) = 100) 100 113.3 
Social 
Benefit-cost ratios 3.41 4.31 
Index (Option (i) = 100) 100 126.4 
Sources: Tables 2 and 3 
APPENDIX 4 
Social Costs of Teacher Education Options 
Option (iii) 
6.53 
106.2 
4.57 
134.0 
Outlays Production Forgone 
Option Year Institutional(a) Private(b) (c) Total 
$ $ $ $ 
(i) 1 2340 193 4330 6,863 
2 2340 193 4600 7,133 
3 2340 193 4960 7,493 
4 ~117 200 8800 10,117 
5 2340 193 9870 12,403 
(ii) 1 2340 193 4330 6,863 
2 2340 193 4600 7,133 
3 2340 193 4960 7,493 
4 2486 193 8800 11,479 
(iii) 1 2892 212 4330 7,434 
2 2967 212 4600 7,779 
3 2967 212 4960 8,139 
NOTES: 
(a) Estimates of institutional outlays on undergraduate and post-graduate 
education study are derived from the 'best estimate' of university teaching 
costs in arts and education respectively. 
Selby Smith, C. The Costs of Post-Secondary Education, Melbourne: 
Macmillan, 1975 Fig 3.5 p.22. The 1969 data has been inflated to January 
prices (1978) using the Universities Commission general salaries index (to 
December 1976) then the increase in the weighted average salary of 
graduate certified assistant teachers in N.S.W. (to Jan. 1978). The 
estimate is that tertiary educational prices"at the latter date were 2.54 times 
the 1969 prices. Outlays for Year 4, option (ii) include professional 
assistance payments of $340. Details of Year 4 option (i) outlays are shown 
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in Table 1. Institutional outlays for C.A. E:s use Selby Smith's best 
estimate of the financial outlays per student in education courses at 
C.A.E:s in 1969 (ibid. p. 31) updated to January 1978 prices. To this is 
added a professional assistance fee for students practical work in schools. 
(b) Private outlays are estimated from the median expenditure on course-
related items by education students at universities and C.A.E:s in 1974 
(Commonwealth Department of Education Income and Expenditure 
Patterns of Australian Tertiary Students in 1974 Canberra: A.G.P.S., 1975, 
Table 36 p. 38) inflated to January 1978 prices by the change over the 
period in the consumer price index (January 1978 C.P.1. = 153 on base 
1974= 100). Year 4 option (i) private outlay obtained from Table 1. 
(c) Production forgone assumes that undergraduate students lose 40 weeks' 
work at an annual (48 week) gross wage equal to the matriculant worker. 
Degree-holders not in the workforce are assumed to forgo production 
valued at the annual salary of a two-year trained assistant teacher. 
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Note: During tertiary education (years 1-5 incl) 'Gross salary' refers to living allowances and 'Tax' refers to course-related outlays. 
APPENDIX 1 
Net Present Values of Incremental Incomes for Teachers with 
Stipulated Tertiary Education above Wages of Matriculant Leavers 
Form of Teacher Preparation-Five year double degree 
Division of Teaching-Secondary 12% NPV 
Events Teacher Salary Matriculant's Wage Disc. of 
Age Years (best estimate of sub- Gross Tax Net Gross Tax Net Diff Fac Diff 
from sequent carreer) 
matri-
cula- 6 7 8 9 tion 2 3 4 5 
1-2 4-5 3-6 7x8 
-" 19 950 170 780 5200 490 4,710 -3930 .8929 
-3509 
00 
20 2 First degree 950 170 780 5,530 550 4,980 -4200 
.7972 -3348 
21 3 950 170 780 5,450 720 5,230 -4450 .7118 
-3167 
22 4 Internship year 4,870 200 4,670 6,370 810 5,568 -890 
.6355 -565 
23 5 Final year, second degree 4,870 170 4,700 6,750 950 5,800 -1100 
.5674 -624 
24 6 First appointment 10,416 2,160 8,316 7,140 1,Q70 6,076 -2246 .5066 -1737 
25 7 Marriage (spouse 6,930 -2359 .4523 -1067 dependent) 11,089 1,800 9,289 7,530 600 
26 8 11,714 2,000 9,764 7,880 710 7,770 -2594 
.4039 -1047 
27 9 12,439 2,200 10,239 8,240 850 7,390 -2849 .3605 
-1027 
28 10 13,014 2,410 10,604 8,630 1,000 7,630 -2974 
.3220 -951 
29 11 13,587 2,580 11,007 8,960 1,100 7,860 -3147 
.2875 -905 
30 12 Inspected for list 2 14,165 2,760 11,400 9,280 1,200 8,080 -3320 .2567 
-852 
31 13 Placed on list 2 14,165 2,760 11,400 9,620 1,310 8,310 -3090 .2242 
-708 
32 14 14,165 2,760 11,400 9,800 1,380 8,420 -2980 .2046 
-610 
33 15 Appointed Subject Master 15,647 3,350 12,300 10,030 1,450 8,580 -3720 .1827 -679 
34 16 15,647 3,350 12,300 10,140 1,460 8,680 -3620 .1631 -590 
35 17 15,647 3,350 12,300 10,260 1,500 8,760 -3540 .1456 -515 
36 18 15,647 3,350 12,300 10,380 1,530 8,830 -3470 .1300 -415 
37 19 I nspected for list 3 15,647 3,350 12,300 10,470 1,600 8,870 -3430 .1161 -348 
38 20 Placed on list 3 15,647 3,350 12,300 10,560 1,600 8,949 -3360 .1037 -348 
39 21 15,647 3,350 12,300 10,680 1,640 9,040 -3260 .0926 -302 
40 22 Appointed Deputy Principal 17,936 4,300 13,460 10,740 1,660 9,080 -4560 .0820 -377 
41 23 Inspected for list 4 17,936 4,300 13,640 10,860 1,700 9,160 -4480 .0738 -330 
42 24 Placed on list 4 17,936 4,300 13,640 10,930 1,760 9,170 -4470 .0659 -294 
43 25 17,936 4,300 13,640 10,980 1,770 9,210 -4430 .0588 -260 
44 26 17,936 4,300 13,640 11,040 1,779 9,250 -4390 .0525 -230 
45 27 Appointed Principal 21,331 5,810 15,520 '.11;,070 1,790 9,280 -6240 .0469 -292 
46 28 21,331 5,810 15,520 11~160 1,800 9,360 -6,160 .0419 -258 
47 29 21,301 5,810 15,520 11,230 1,810 9,420 -6100 .0374 -228 
48 30 21,331 5,810 15,520 11,330 1,840 9,490 -6030 .0334 -201 
-" 
49 31 21,331 5,810 15,520 11,360 1,840 9,520 -6000 .0189 -113 
<.0 50 32 21,331 5,810 15,520 11,400 1,850 9,550 -5972 .0169 -111 
51 33 21,331 5,810 15,520 11,480 1,850 9,630 -5890 .0151 -110 
52 34 21,331 5,810 15,520 11,600 1,900 9,700 -5820 .0135 -108 
53 35 21,331 5,810 15,520 11,720 1,920 9,800 -5720 .0120 -107 
54 36 21,331 5,810 15,520 11,800 1,960 9,840 -5680 .0107 -106 
55 37 21,331 5,810 15,520 11,910 2,000 9,910 -5610 .0100 -106 
56 38 21,331 5,810 15,520 12,020 2,060 9,960 -5540 .0085 -105 
57 39 21,331 5,810 15,520 12,120 2,090 10,030 -5490 .0076 -104 
58 40 21,331 5,810 15,320 12,350 2,160 10,250 -5270 .0068 -100 
59 41 21,331 5,810 15,520 12,520 2,220 10,300 -5200 .0061 -99 
60 42 21,331 5,810 15,520 12,670 2,300 10,370 -5750 .0054 -97 
61 43 21,337 5,810 15,520 12,790 2,350 10,440 -5080 .0050 -96 
62 44 21,331 5,810 15,520 13,000 2,400 10,600 -4920 .0045 -93 
63 45 21,331 5,810 15,520 13,200 2,460 10,740 -4780 .0061 -90 
64 46 21,331 5,810 15,520 13,500 2,600 10,900 -4620 .0061 -87 
Note: During tertiary education (years 1-5 incl) 'Gross salary' refers to living allowances and 'Tax' refers to course-related outlays. 
APPENDIX 2 
Net Present Values of Incremental Incomes for Teachers with 
Stipulated Tertiary Education above Wages of Matriculant Leaver 
Form of Teacher Preparation-Four year degree & diploma 
Division of Teaching-Secondary 12% NPV 
Teacher Salary Matriculant's Wage 
Disc. of 
Events Tax Net Gross Tax Net Diff 
Fac Diff 
Age Years (best estimate of sub- Gross 
from sequent carreer) 
matri-
cula- 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
9 
tion 1-2 4-5 3-6 
7x8 
193 607 5,200 490 4,710 -4104 
.8929 -3664 
19 1 900 550 4,980 -3573 .7972 -2848 1,600 193 1,407 5,530 20 2 193 2,227 5,450 720 5,230 -3003 
.7118 -2138 
21 3 Tertiary education* 2,420 -2253 .6355 -1433 193 3,307 6,370 810 5,568 ~ 22 4 3,500 -2041 .5674 -1150 1,900 7,841 6,750 950 5,800 
23 5 First appointment 9,741 -2246 .5066 -1137 10,416 2,100 8,316 ,7,140 1,Q70 6,076 24 6 1,800 9,289 7,530 600 6,930 -2359 .4523 
-1069 
25 7 Marries (spouse dependent) 11,089 -2594 .4039 -1047 11,764 2,000 9,764 7,880 710 7,770 26 8 -2849 .3606 -1027 12,439 2,200 10,239 8,240 850 7,390 27 9 -2974 .3220 -957 13,014 2,410 10,604 8,630 1,000 7,630 28 10 -3147 .2875 -904 13,587 2,580 11,007 8,960 1,100 7,860 29 11 -3,320 .2567 -852 
12 Inspected for List 2 14,165 2,760 11,400 
9,280 1,200 8,080 
.2242 -708 30 14,165 2,760 11,400 9,620 1,310 8,310 
-3090 
31 13 Placed on List 2 8,420 -2980 .2046 -610 14,165 2,760 11,400 9,800 1,380 32 14 -2820 .1827 -515 14,165 2,760 11,400 10,030 1,450 8,580 33 15 1,460 8,680 -3620 .1631 -590 15,647 3,350 12,305 10,140 34 16 Appointed Subject Master 1,500 8,760 -3540 .1456 -575 
35 17 15,647 3,350 
12,305 10,260 
-3740 .1300 -415 
15,647 3,350 12,305 10,380 1,530 8,830 36 18 1,600 8,800 -3430 .1161 -398 
37 19 15,647 3,350 
12,305 10,470 
38 20 Inspected for List 3 15,647 3,350 12,305 10,560 1,600 8,949 -3360 .1037 -348 
39 21 Placed on List 3 15,647 3,350 12,305 10,680 1,640 9,040 -3260 .0926 -302 
40 22 15,647 3,350 12,305 10,740 1,660 9,080 -3220 .0820 -266 
41 23 Appointed Deputy Principal 17,936 4,300 13,640 10,860 1,700 9,160 -4480 .0738 -330 
42 24 Inspected for List 4 17,936 4,300 13,640 10,930 1,760 9,170 -4470 .0659 -294 
43 25 17,936 4,300 13,640 10,980 1,770 9,210 -4430 .0588 -260 
44 26 17,936 4,300 13,640 11,040 1,779 9,250 -4390 .0525 -230 
45 27 17,936 4,300 13,640 11,070 1.790 9,280 -4360 .0469 -204 
46 28 Appointed Principal 21,331 5,810 15,520 11,160 1,800 9,360 -6160 .0419 -258 
47 29 21,331 5,810 15,520 11,230 1,810 9,420 -6100 .0374 -228 
48 30 21,331 5,810 15,520 '.1:1,330 1,840 9,490 -6030 .0334 -201 
49 31 21,331 5,810 15,520 11.360 1,840 9,520 -6000 .0189 -113 
50 32 21,331 5,810 15,520 11,400 1,850 9,550 -5970 .0169 -113 
51 33 21,331 5,810 15,520 11,480 1,850 9,630 -5890 .0151 -111 
N 52 34 21,331 5,810 15,520 11,600 1,900 9,700 -5820 .0135 -110 
...... 
53 35 21,331 5,810 15,520 11,720 1,920 9,800 -5920 .0120 -108 
54 36 21,331 5,810 15,520 11,800 1,960 9,840 -5680 .0107 -107 
55 37 21,331 5,810 15,520 11,910 2,000 9,910 -5610 .Q1oo -106 
56 38 21,331 5,810 15,520 12,020 2,060 9,960 -5540 .0085 -105 
57 39 21,331 5,810 15,520 12,120 2,090 10,030 -4590 .0076 -104 
58 40 21,331 5,810 15,520 12,350 2,160 10,250 -5270 .0068 -100 
59 41 21,331 5,810 15,520 12,520 2,220 10,300 -5200 .0061 -99 
60 42 21,331 5,810 15,520 12,670 2,300 10,370 -5150 .0054 -97 
61 43 21,331 5,810 15,520 12,790 2,350 10,440 -5080 .0050 -96 
62 44 21,331 5,810 15,520 13,000 2,400 10,600 -4920 .0045 -93 
63 45 21,331 5,810 15,520 13,200 2,460 10,740 -4780 .0061 -90 
64 46 21,331 5,810 15,520 13,500 2,600 10,900 -4620 .0061 -87 
NOTE: During tertiary education 'Gross Salary' refers to living allowances and 'Tax' refers to course-related outlays. 
APPENDIX 3 Option (Hi) 
Net Present Values of Incremental Incomes for Teachers with 
Stipulated Tertiary Education above Wages of Matriculant Leavers 
Form of Teacher Preparation-Five year double degree 
Division of Teaching-Secondary 12% NPV 
Teacher Salary Matriculant's Wage Disc. of Events Diff Fac Diff 
Age Years (best estimate of sub- Gross Tax Net Gross Tax Net 
from sequent carreer) 
matri-
cula- 4 5 6 7 8 9 2 3 tion 4-5 3-6 7x8 1-2 
19 1 900 212 688 5,200 490 
4,710 -4,022 .8,929 -3,591 
5,530 550 4,980 -3,592 .7,972 -2864 
20 2 Tertiary education 1,600 212 1,388 5,230 -3022 .7118 -2151 
21 3 2,420 212 2,208 5,450 
720 
4 First appointment 9,057 1,660 7,397 6,370 810 5,568 
-1840 .6355 -1169 
22 
.5,674 -1,112 
23 5 9,608 1,850 7,758 6,750 
950 5,800 -1,960 
10,159 2,080 8,079 7,140 1,070 6,076 -2010 .5066 
-1018 
24 6 
7 Marries (spouse dependent) 10,711 1,670 9,041 7,530 600 6,930 -2,110 .4,523 
-954 
25 
.4039 -904 11,260 1,850 7,758 7,880 710 7,770 -2240 26 8 
.3606 -865 
9 Inspected for List 1 11,811 2,020 9,791 8,240 850 7,390 
-2400 
27 
.3220 -772 
10 Placed on List 1 12,140 2,110 10,030 8,630 1,000 7,630 
-2400 
28 10,250 8,960 1,100 7,860 -2390 .2875 -687 29 11 12,468 2,220 
12,468 2,220 10,250 9,280 1,200 8,080 -2170 .2567 
-557 
30 12 
12,468 2,220 10,250 9,620 1,310 8,310 -1940 .2242 
-445 
31 13 9,800 1,380 8,420 -3080 .2046 -630 32 14 Appointed Deputy Master 14,334 2,830 11,500 
15 Inspected for List 2 14,334 2,830 11,500 10,030 1,450 8,580 
-2420 .1827 -533 
33 2,830 11,500 10,140 1,460 8,680 -2820 .1631 -459 34 16 Placed on List 2 14,334 
35 16 14,334 2,830 11,500 10,260 1,500 8,760 -2740 .1456 -399 
36 18 14,334 2,830 11,500 10,380 1,530 8,830 -2670 .1300 -347 
37 19 14,334 2,830 11,500 10,470 1,600 8,870 -2630 .1161 -305 
38 20 14,334 2,830 11,500 10,560 1,600 8,949 -2560 .1037 -265 
39 21 14,334 2,830 11,500 10,680 1,640 9,040 -2460 .0926 -228 
40 22 Appointed Principal, 15,904 3,450 12,450 10,740 1,660 9,080 -3370 .0820 -278 
41 23 class 2 15,904 3,450 12,450 10,860 1,700 9,160 -3290 .0738 -243 
42 24 15,904 3,450 12,450 10,930 1,760 9,170 -3280 .0659 -216 
43 25 Inspected for list 4 15,904 3,450 12,450 10,980 1,770 9,210 -3240 .0588 -190 
44 26 15,904 3,450 12,450.,' ;,11,040 1,779 9,250 -3200 .0525 -168 
45 27 15,904 3,450 12,450 ' 11,070 1,790 9,280 -3170 .0469 -149 
46 28 15,904 3,450 12,450 11,160 1,800 9,360 -3090 .0419 -130 
47 29 15,904 3,450 12,450 11,230 1,810 9,420 -3030 .0374 -113 
48 30 15,904 3,450 12,450 11,330 1,840 9,490 -2960 .0334 -99 
49 31 15,904 3,450 12,450 11,360 1,840 9,520 -2930 .0189 -55 
50 32 Principal, class 1 19,364 4,910 14,450 11,400 1,850 9,550 -4900 .0169 -93 
51 33 19,364 4,910 14,450 11,480 18,50 9,630 -4820 .0151 -91 
52 34 19,364 4,910 14,450 11,160 1,900 9,700 -4750 .0135 -90 
53 35 19,364 4,910 14,450 11,720 1,920 9,800 -4650 .0120 -88 
54 36 19,364 4,910 14,450 11,800 1,960 9,840 -4540 .0107 -86 
55 37 19,364 4,910 14,450 11,910 2,000 9,910 -4490 .0100 -85 
56 38 19,364 4,910 14,450 12,020 2,060 9,960 -4420 .0085 -84 
57 39 19,364 4,910 14,450 12,120 2,090 10,030 -4200 .0076 -79 
58 40 19,364 4,910 14,450 12,350 2,160 10,250 -4150 .0068 -78 
59 41 19,364 4,910 14,450 12,520 2,220 10,300 -4080 .0061 -77 
60 42 19,364 4,910 14,450 12,670 2,300 10,370 -4010 .0054 -76 
61 43 19,364 4,910 14,450 12,790 2,350 10,440 -3850 .0050 -73 
62 44 19,364 4,910 14,450 13,000 2,400 10,600 -3710 .0045 -70 
63 45 19,364 4,910 14,450 13,200 2,460 10,740 -3700 .0061 -69 
64 46 19,364 4,910 14,450 13,500 2,600 10,900 -3550 .0061 -67 
